Non-State Actors in International Law: A Rejoinder to Professor Thirlway by unknown
SHORTER ARTICLE
Non-State Actors in International Law: A Rejoinder
to Professor Thirlway
Cedric Ryngaert1
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract That we consider the state-based system as best representing the indi-
vidual is the product of a particular world view. A ‘naturalized myth’ renders
inevitable the link between the physicality of the observable landscape and the state
as a means of organizing a polity. This myth lingers on in international legal
scholarship, although it has been debunked in other disciplines, notably in critical
political geography. (Public) international lawyers can learn from their brethren in
other disciplines and problematize the territorial state as a contingent political
concept. Awareness of the social production of space may allow lawyers to imagine
practices of resistance to the spatial status quo, in particular rights of non-state
actors in the production of international law, alongside states, and obligations and
responsibilities of non-state actors, especially where states have proved unable to
properly assume roles of protection vis-a`-vis individuals under their formal
jurisdiction.
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It is rather unusual for an author to receive a lengthy written reaction, let alone in
the form of an unsolicited academic contribution, to one’s writings, even if it is the
aim of academic publishing to stir up debate. Therefore, I am very grateful to
Professor Thirlway for his reaction to my food-for-thought piece on non-state actors
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and international law,1 as well as to the Review for inviting me to write a short
rejoinder. Professor Thirlway’s article is a very thoughtful one, making a variety of
points. I cannot possibly do justice to all the issues he has brought up in relation to
my earlier article. Accordingly, I have chosen to engage more at length with the
fundamental premise of the reaction: that the system of international law is, and can
only be, based on states. This is a position which is descriptively relatively accurate,
but it is in my view epistemically and normatively problematic.
Underlying Professor Thirlway’s argument is an assumption that the state-based
international system is both rational and just. In essence, Professor Thirlway argues
that because individuals are always in a territorial space, their interests and needs
are best represented and served by the sovereign state on whose territory they find
themselves. In my view, however, this is begging the question. That we consider the
state-based system as best representing the individual is the product of a particular
world view which, assisted by the development of modern cartographic maps,
considers territorially delimited states to be the only relevant actors that can have a
legitimate representative function. This naturalized myth of the state, also
characterized as ‘the territorial trap’,2 renders inevitable, and not subject to
contestation, the link between the physicality of the observable landscape and the
state as a means of organizing a polity. While this myth lingers on in international
legal scholarship,3 it has been debunked in other disciplines, notably in critical
political geography.4 The territorial state is ultimately a means of political
technology which advances the self-serving goals of particular actors (elites) which
do not necessarily represent the wishes of the people ‘trapped’ in a state’s territory.
Non-democratic, autocratic states may serve as proof thereof, but more fundamen-
tally, from a historical perspective, the very rise of the territorial state in the early
modern period points to the existence of prior, alternative forms of regulation that
could be non-territorial or non-state based.5 As John Agnew has observed in this
respect, ‘political authority is not necessarily predicated on and defined by strict and
fixed territorial boundaries’.6 It has been my hope that (public) international lawyers
learn from their brethren in other disciplines and problematize the territorial state as
a contingent political concept. That textbooks on international law define states as
possessing territory and having sovereignty over it—as Professor Thirlway
1 Thirlway (2017).
2 Shah (2012), pp. 57–58 (the territorial trap ‘is reproduced through the assumption that territory is the
physical substratum of the state’).
3 Professor Thirlway is stepping into this territorial trap where he writes as follows: ‘The domination of
the State in international law is thus by no means a quaint survival, nor the outcome of a power-struggle
with NSAs that could have gone the other way, and could be refought to a different outcome; it is based
on realities and physical fact.’ Issue could be taken for that matter with the ‘reality’ and ‘fact’ that the
state is a dominant political actor in global governance. Some multinational corporations, non-state armed
groups and even non-governmental organizations rival states in wealth, power, and influence. It is this
‘reality’ which informs calls for an enhanced international legal status for non-state actors. Such a status
could close the gap between the presence of power and the absence of law.
4 Elden (2013). See from a critical legal perspective, taking his cue from geography: Ford (1999).





highlights—is obviously true, but it simply exposes our discipline’s territorial bias.
It should not preclude a critical inquiry as to why territorial states have come to be
considered as the main containers of political authority.
By restricting spatiality to the physical territorial presence of individuals,
Professor Thirlway has obvious difficulties in conceiving of political authority in a
space beyond the state. Every foothold is—literally—‘under the control of States as
sovereigns over territory’. ‘Counter-spatial’ conditions that rival state-based
territoriality, in particular non-state or global mechanisms of authority, need not
be unimaginable, however.7
Let me embark on this argument by starting with a view which I share with
Professor Thirlway, namely that ‘to act effectively in space, occupation of a point or
points in space […] is essential’. Indeed, as Guilfoyle has observed, ‘humans do not
exist in pure space but rather in places which are ‘‘relational, historical and
concerned with identity’’; a place has a history and a set of social usages […] Law
operates through social agency: it operates on concrete or constructed places, not in
abstract space’.8 This distinction between ‘space’ and ‘place’ is reminiscent of the
French Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre’s work. According to Lefebvre, space is
socially produced through the interplay between actual spatial practices (‘l’espace
perc¸u) and conceptual spatial representations (‘l’espace conc¸u’).9 It is ultimately the
‘lived experience of everyday life’ which enables ‘abstract space’ to be reproduced
as concrete space, or ‘place’.10
This reproduction does not happen naturally, of course, but is driven by self-
interested socio-political forces. Historical-material practices have then led to the
construction of specific places, and the territorial state is one of them. It is precisely
the awareness of the social production of space that allows us to imagine practices
of resistance to the spatial status quo. It allows us, for instance, to imagine rights of
non-state actors in the production of international law, alongside states, and to
imagine obligations and responsibilities of non-state actors, especially where states
have proved unable to properly assume roles of protection vis-a`-vis individuals
under their formal jurisdiction. Non-state actors, even when not exercising any sort
of territorial control, also exist in a concrete space that is enclosed and delimited
from other spaces. For instance, the spatial relations of multinational corporations
are of a global, networked, nodal nature; they are delimited from other relations that
have no bearing on the corporation’s activities. From a normative perspective, such
corporations may admittedly make use of state territory for the production of goods
and services and are as such bound by state legislation (corporations are subjects of
national law, as Professor Thirlway correctly points out). However, as their scope of
action and relations are international, and their power sometimes dwarfs the power
7 Liste (2014), p. 3.
8 Guilfoyle (2016), p. 199.
9 Lefebvre (1991), pp. 26, 33.
10 Jones (2016), p. 325 (‘Place is about location, identity, relationships, and the experience of living
somewhere. Places are experienced in different ways by different people, and asserting this plurality and
specificity of place against the empty and singular form of space’), citing, apart from Lefebvre’s work,
also Massey (1993).
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of the state, they may create a sphere of non-state normativity. Such a sphere is not
territorially delimited, but it is nevertheless spatially delimited as a functionally
differentiated, relatively self-contained ‘system’ that is self-organized by corporate
stakeholders.11
This is not to say that non-state actors never aspire to the spatiality of the
territorially organized state. Some do, and this is what I meant when writing that for
some non-state actors, ‘statehood may appear to be the ultimate prize’. De facto
states, puppet states, putative states—entities which possess most but not all of the
trappings of statehood—all crave for international recognition that renders them
effective and legitimate states.12 Other organized non-state actors—mainly non-
governmental organizations and non-state armed groups—may only be interested in
particular rights that have historically been associated with statehood, e.g., the right
to participate in international conferences, organizations, and dispute-settlement
mechanisms, or the right to use force and to be entitled to combatant privilege.
Other non-state actors—multinational corporations stand out in this respect—may
not be interested at all in international legal status. By lobbying they may have an
influence on state and international regulation anyway, while at the same time
regulating themselves via non-traditional sources. This obviates the need for enhanced
participatory rights at the classic intergovernmental level, whereas the obligations
dimension of international legal status can in turn only adversely affect their
operations and profit maximization. Calls for international legal status then typically
emanate from other (civil society) non-actors, which use political platforms or the
courts to make their case. Such efforts are understandably rebuffed by multinational
corporations, but it is conspicuous—although evidently self-serving—that they may
invoke to their benefit cognate concepts of state territoriality. For instance, they have
resisted expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction on grounds of territorial jurisdiction and
the principle of non-intervention,13 and they have resisted the imposition of direct
human rights obligations on the ground that human rights have been conceived for
vertical relationships of authority between a government and an individual rather than
for horizontal relationships between non-state actors.14
In my article I wanted to draw attention to the rights and obligations of non-state
actors under existing (positive) international law, as a foil for a more fundamental
rethinking of our state-based concept of international legal personality. I venture to
characterize the exposition of these existing arrangements as a critical redescription
of the law. Sundhya Pahuja has defined this as ‘an attempt to redefine […] a world
we take for granted, inviting it to be seen differently as a mode of political
engagement’.15 With this redescription, I hope to have made visible the legal strides
11 Pulkowski (2014), pp. 200–201 (explaining that in systems theory geographic borders are less relevant
and functional, while systemic delimitations are more important, as well as that in this theory formal
state-engendered sources are not relevant, but instead that ‘legal rules emerge on the basis of a self-
organizing process of mutual constitution of legal acts and structures’). See for systems theory: Luhmann
and Kastner (2004) and Teubner (1988).
12 Ivanel (2015).
13 Liste (2016), p. 235.
14 See for an interesting argument to overcome this verticality obstacle: Karavias (2013).
15 Pahuja (2013), p. 65.
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that non-state actors have made in the international legal system and to have
highlighted that such strides—or conversely the absence of greater leaps—are the
outcomes of the workings of power.16 This redescription allows us to better
understand the current legal relationships between non-state actors and states, and
between non-state actors among themselves, including state pushback. It also
enables us to envisage, as an incremental step, an alternative world in which non-
state actors have acquired enhanced normative agency. I do not necessarily consider
such a world to be normatively desirable, in the sense of being somehow ‘better’
than the current state-dominated system. My article was rather an exhortation not to
take the latter system as self-evident but instead to further explore the potential of
enhanced legal status for non-state actors in terms of the legitimacy and
effectiveness of international law and global governance as a whole.
I have consciously refrained from making very specific suggestions for an
adaptation or improvement of the international legal system, not just because such
suggestions risk being haphazard, but, in all honesty, also because I struggle myself
to envision particular aspects of an enhanced international legal status. For instance,
there is no ready answer, as far as I am concerned, as to whether it is ‘fair’ to
encumber corporations with direct human rights obligations, whether it is ‘practical’
or ‘legitimate’ to enhance the participatory rights of non-governmental organiza-
tions, or whether non-state armed groups should have the international ‘right to
rebel’ against their own (repressive) government.17 This requires careful analysis
that takes into account the unwelcome side-effects on the stability and justice of the
international legal system. In fact, borrowing from Lefebvre, I mainly advocate a
return to the conceptualization of ‘abstract’ spatial relations, and invite the reader to
contemplate and evaluate alternative, concrete spatial relations in which non-state
actors play a more prominent role. Or put differently, borrowing from Deleuze,
Le´vy, and Hildebrandt, I draw attention to ‘the virtual’ sphere of social relations and
the contingency of different ways of actualization, with the state-based international
regulatory sphere being just one of them.18 Virtualization of the governance
problem, which the state system was meant to solve, could then open our minds to
different actualizations of global governance, involving various non-state actors
alongside states.
There is no doubt that I agree with Professor Thirlway’s observation that non-
state actors ‘do not need to be on a par with States’. In this respect, Professor
Thirlway is possibly making too much of my statement that some non-state actors
aspire to statehood. I do not argue that non-state actors should be allocated the same
bundle of rights and obligations as states (‘full legal personality’). However,
building on existing arrangements, there may be room to consider expanding the
catalogue of international rights and obligations for specific non-state actors, to the
extent that this responds to the functional needs of the international community, to
16 Orford (2012), pp. 609, 622, 624 (also relying on Michel Foucault).
17 See regarding the latter e.g. Paust (1983).
18 Deleuze (1994). Le´vy (1998). I am grateful to Mireille Hildebrandt for pointing this out to me:
Hildebrandt (2017).
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use the ICJ’s terminology in the Reparation opinion.19 In the current state-
dominated system, such expansions will have to be decided on by states as the
gatekeepers of the system. As states are not likely to drastically overhaul the system
in ways that may ultimately work to their disadvantage, it is expected that the public
international law system will remain state-centred, at least in the near future.
If that is the case, however, does public international law not risk relegating itself
to the margins of the regulation of international affairs? Will parallel systems of
non-state regulation and accountability not increase in number and scope and
address a considerable number of international/global/transnational matters? Such
systems already exist—think of transnational private regulatory arrangements
coming about in multi-stakeholder dialogues—but they may well grow as a result of
the dissatisfaction of non-state actors with state regulation, e.g., in the technological
sector.20 Non-state regulatory systems may not properly be called ‘public
international law’, but they may have normative force, as Professor Thirlway
would probably agree.21 Whether this ‘pluralization’ of international regulation—
which goes far beyond the fragmentation of international law22—is something to
lament is an open question. Still, there is an inherent attractiveness in finding, or
creating, some unity in the diversity: to connect different regulatory systems to each
other, if only to prevent normative overlap and conflict in the legal governance of
human problems. This also explains why Philip Jessup, back in 1956, coined the
term ‘transnational law’, to denote not only the law governing the ‘society of states’
(public international law) but also the rules governing ‘transnational situations’, that
‘involve individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups’.23
A reconsideration and actualization of Jessup’s proposal may well be called for.24
Given the literary references which have infused the arguments made in our
respective contributions, let me end by reinterpreting the two lines of T.S. Eliot’s
long poem The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock, quoted at the end of Professor
Thirlway’s article: ‘No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be; Am an
attendant lord,…’.25 Sure enough, these lines could be interpreted, when applied by
analogy to non-state actors, as non-state actors acquiescing in their destiny as
secondary actors on the world stage in the shadow of the society of states. This
19 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1949, p. 187.
20 Ryngaert and Zoetekouw (2017) (forthcoming).
21 Compare Professor Thirlway’s argument that an agreement concluded between a state and a non-state
actor, or between non-state actors would not normally be called a ‘treaty’, but would nevertheless have
legal force.
22 See on the fragmentation of international law: Report of the International Law Commission 2006,
Fifty-eighth session, UN General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-Eighth Session, UN Doc.
No. A/CN.4/L.682.
23 Jessup (1956), p. 2.
24 There is in fact no shortage of interest in Jessup’s work. See, e.g., 60 years after publication:
Conference on Jessup’s Bold Proposal: Engagements with Transnational Law, Transnational Law
Institute, King’s College London, 2–3 July 2016, available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/tli/events/jessup-
conference.aspx; and 50 years after publication: http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/
files/altbestand/Heft50.pdf.
25 The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock (1920), ll. 111–3.
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secondary role is indeed the common understanding of the term ‘attendant lord’, as
a lord who literally attends to the desires of his overlord. In that sense, the non-state
actor is in fact not just a secondary actor, but also one who has little agency of his
own. His role is to reinforce, or at least not to undermine the position of his state-
master, who may expect something in return for conferring legal status on the non-
state actor. However, there is another, more etymological way of interpreting the
term ‘attendant lord’: a lord who is waiting (from the French ‘attendre’). The female
equivalent of ‘attendant lord’, ‘lady-in-waiting’, is even more explicit in this regard.
Perhaps these attendant lords and ladies-in-waiting are only biding their time,
waiting for the day of emancipation and ascendancy to power. It would not be the
first time in history that attendants or companions seize power; think of the
Mamluks, slaves who dominated the military in Islamic societies, who overthrew
the Ayyubids dynasty in 1250, and claimed for themselves the Sultanate of Egypt
and the Levant.26 What is key is that these actors are bothered by political
questions,27 and are willing to challenge an existing system that insufficiently
accommodates their concerns and demands. Prufrock himself surely met the first
condition. While having an inferiority complex towards Hamlet, he ‘is bothered by
the big questions’, and ‘does not withdraw entirely into tea and toast’.28 Mounting a
challenge against the system, he does not. But it is hardly certain that Prufrock’s
acquiescence will be imitated by non-state actors whose desire for more autonomy
is hampered by the current system of international law.
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